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Introduction 
 
 
Once seen as the cornerstone of mainstream International Relations (IR), the concept of sovereignty 
has recently been re-appropriated by critical and post-colonial scholars. Instead of embracing the idea 
of sovereignty as unquestionable and universal, these scholars have enquired into the origin(s) and 
cultural specificity of the concept as currently used by most of the discipline. Indeed, if sovereignty is 
to be accepted as the “final and absolute authority in the political community,”1 post-colonial scholars 
have shown how this final and absolute authority – i.e. an authority that is worth respecting and that 
will ensure the independence of the entity concerned – has been associated with a cultural or 
civilisational framework defined by the West. The concept of sovereignty used in international 
relations thus celebrates an idealised Western model of statehood and society (and in turn serves to 
erase alternative sovereignties).2 As Anghie argues, “sovereignty became identified with a specific set 
of cultural practices to the exclusion of others” and as such has been “aligned with European ideas of 
social order, political organization, progress and development”. 3  Such a cultural definition of 
sovereignty based on idealised Western values evolves through time yet one particular moment has 
attracted a vast amount of attention: the European encounter with the Amerindian populations of the 
‘New World’ in the sixteenth century. These populations were described as living in a ‘state of nature’ 
and in need of the ‘civilised’ teaching of more ‘advanced’ (and thus sovereign) nations. This specific 
rationale has evolved yet it continues to inform the contemporary practice of sovereignty.4 
 
 
One aspect strongly emphasised by critical and post-colonial scholars is the impossibility of 
understanding sovereignty without looking at the colonial ideologies and practices developed by 
 
 
Western states. Yet despite the recognition that the processes of ‘domestically’ and ‘internationally’ 
claiming sovereignty are interlinked,5 a detailed analysis of how this interconnection functions when 
sovereignty is constructed or contested is still lacking. The colonial claims to sovereignty made by 
Western states are now regularly included or mentioned in critical studies of sovereignty as an intrinsic 
part of the history of the concept6 but the domestic and colonial spheres remain analysed separately 
with a primary focus on the external colonial encounter. This is intriguing as critical scholars have 
revealed two crucial aspects about the construction of sovereignty: first, that there are strong 
similarities between the domestic and international claims to sovereignty (such as the ‘presence’ of 
savage Others in both spheres). 7  ‘Colonial’ encounters indeed happened both domestically and 
internationally and were essential in the process of building sovereignty. Potential synergies are 
therefore to be expected and could shed light on the conditions required for successfully claiming 
sovereignty. In addition, critical scholars have argued that sovereignty transcends the 
domestic/international binary and “forms the crucial link between anarchy and hierarchy”.8 Studying 
the interaction, connection and interplay between the domestic and international colonial encounters 
is thus essential if we are to reveal a fuller picture of ‘civilised’ sovereignty. 
 
 
In this article, I explore what we learn when we consider together the two processes of constructing 
sovereignty ‘internally’ and ‘externally’. I analyse the two spheres conjointly in order to be able to 
answer new questions: How are the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ processes connected and how do they 
interact? How are these two processes used by political actors and do they play a role in managing 
the inherent ambiguities that accompany the performance of sovereignty? This article offers an 
exploration of these questions through the example of France in the 16th century. It shows, first, that 
sovereignty depends on unstable colonial frontiers, i.e. differentiations between the civilised and the 
savage, that are constantly contested and re-established. One of these frontiers is performed ‘inside’ 
the sovereign state and one between ‘it’ and its ‘outside’ Others. Thanks to the combined analysis of 
the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ colonial encounters, establishing Western sovereignty is shown to be a 
fragile process appealing to one set of conceptual constructs and designed to place savagery at the 
margins of the sovereign state. Second, the combined analysis of the two spheres highlights how these 
colonial frontiers reinforce one another and serve as objectified (and naturalised) realities pre-existing 
their performance by the sovereign voice. In other words, the savage identities developed in the 
external colonial encounter become used as an objective basis in the process of claiming sovereignty 
domestically. The artificiality of the constitution of ‘civilised’ sovereignty in the West is thus hidden 
behind the appeal to the supposedly incontestable savage identities existing in the colonies. 
 
 
Through this exploration of civilised sovereignty this article confirms the arguments of post-colonial 
and critical scholars while also making several contributions. It rebalances the focus of these analyses 
away from the ‘exceptional’, ‘radical’ and ‘savage’ encounter with the non-West and towards the day-
to-day processes through which Western states build their civilised and sovereign identity over both 
their domestic and the non-Western Others. In addition, and by combining the domestic and 
 
 
international processes through which sovereignty is claimed, I shed light on the way these processes 
interact – and in particular how they come to provide an ‘objective’ and ‘natural’ basis for one another 
– through a detailed analysis of primary sources about the construction of sovereignty pre-1648. 
Finally, this article reveals the inescapable yet threatening reliance of sovereignty on the presence of 
the ‘savage’, i.e. the way discourses of sovereignty (re)create a savagery that they contain at the same 
time. The maintenance of Western sovereignty thus depends on a capacity to relegate to the 
(domestic and international) margins the ‘savage Others’ that are necessary to maintain the illusion 
of a civilised unity.  
 
 
This article is divided into four sections: first, I explain how post-colonial and critical scholars have 
challenged our thinking about sovereignty (and in particular about the universalised yet local notion 
of ‘civilised sovereignty’) and how this article contributes to this literature. Section two focuses on 
France in the 16th century. I analyse how the ‘civilised’ identity of France is destabilised during a ‘crisis 
of sovereignty’ in France: the Catholic League’s rebellion against monarchical authority at the end of 
the 16th century. In the third section I complement this analysis with contemporary French perceptions 
of the Canadian Amerindians (henceforth Amerindians). I deliberately juxtapose the domestic and 
international sides of the construction of civilised sovereignty in an attempt to disrupt the naturalised 
frontier between domestic/civilised on one side and external/savage on the other. This comparison 
enables me to identify (in a fourth section) how the two colonial frontiers enacted through the 
discourses of sovereignty interact with one another in the re-establishment of ‘civilised’ sovereignty 
domestically. 
 
 
This article is based on sixteenth-century French archival sources in order to explore the conceptual 
apparatus deployed in discourses of sovereignty, i.e. how ideas were used and combined in order to 
successfully perform the identity of the sovereign state. Situating this conceptual history in the 16th 
century is justified for two reasons: first, this period marks the intensification of the centralisation of 
the sovereign power in the hands of the European kings. Secondly, it also witnessed the first European 
explorations of America and the beginning of modern colonialism. This period is therefore a vital 
litmus test both for the domestic and international construction of civilised sovereignty.9 This article, 
however, insists on the specificity of the case under study: instead of claiming universal validity, my 
ambition is limited to providing an historical example of the way sovereignty was linked to a 
civilisational discourse and relied on the creation of colonial frontiers. This article does not want to 
reduce the diversity of processes and actors involved; in particular, other discursive constructions 
were at play in the performance of sovereignty and an exploration of civilisation/savagery does not 
cover every aspect of sovereignty. This article therefore captures only one (but a nevertheless 
important) way through which sovereignty was articulated in this specific historical period and does 
not pretend to ‘explain’ how sovereignty emerged or was ‘created’. In addition, bringing together an 
internal struggle for political power with a colonial claim to sovereignty (and highlighting some of their 
similarities) should not detract from the clear differences that exist between the actors involved in 
 
 
both cases. Compared to the distant savages, Otherised actors in the West remain relatively equal as 
they share a civilised (yet for some degenerate) status. The distant savage, on the contrary, is 
portrayed as essentially deprived of civilisation. The actors involved in these claims to sovereignty are 
thus neither identical nor equal. If sovereignty is claimed in both cases with performances of 
civilisation and savagery, it is the links made between these two spheres – rather than their similarity 
– that is at the centre of the analysis. 
 
 
To achieve the ambitions of this article and deconstruct such naturalised identities as ‘civilised’ and 
‘savage’ I approach sovereignty discourses as ‘performative’. Performativity suggests that no state is 
‘naturally’ there outside of the sovereign discourses that create ‘it’. Hence, “no state possesses a 
prediscursive, stable identity”, i.e. stable foundations on which to ground a discourse.10 In other words, 
discourses of sovereignty build both sovereignty and its foundation or identity. As Weber argued “the 
identity of the state is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its 
result”.11 This understanding of the concept of sovereignty is particularly useful insofar as it enables 
me to interrogate the discursive construction of the foundations of civilised sovereignty. As such, 
performativity offers the possibility of a radical deconstruction of the concept.12 
 
 
 
Civilised Sovereignty and Colonial Encounters 
 
 
In the past twenty five years IR has witnessed a flourishing of new analyses investigating how 
sovereignty is historically contingent and dependent on the dominant values, ideologies and norms of 
each period. 13  Additionally, sovereignty has been shown to be a socially constructed concept 
influenced by the practices of the agents themselves.14 Nevertheless, these analyses have remained 
limited in their ability to problematise the use of sovereignty in international relations and IR alike. 
Indeed, a large part of this literature has overlooked how sovereignty – insofar as its dominant 
conceptualisation is defined by the West15 – perpetuates exclusions and inequality at the international 
level. A majority of these scholars has approached sovereignty as a socially constructed yet largely 
unproblematic concept thus leaving “unchanged the conventional picture as portrayed by mainstream 
theorists.”16 
 
 
In contrast, post-colonial and critical scholars have made a strong and convincing case for linking the 
dominant conceptualisation of sovereignty to an idealised notion of Western civilisation. Their first 
major insight is the fact that ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ have been restricted to a Western understanding 
yet imposed universally under the guise of culturally neutral (analytical) tools. As a consequence, the 
acquisition of sovereignty by non-Western states should not be interpreted as an empowering and 
liberating movement but rather as debilitating and excluding non-Western states further, usually 
 
 
requiring them to surrender “important rights in order to achieve independence”. 17  Because its 
template is defined by the West sovereignty gives rise to a complex interplay between 
inclusion/equality – or, for the non-West, the prospect of achieving them – and the actual exclusion 
of the supposedly uncivilised and unsovereign non-West. 18  Post-colonial approaches therefore 
promote a radical departure from the traditional vision of sovereignty as a tool for emancipation and 
freedom. By shaping what a sovereign state can (or should) be, the discourses of sovereignty 
promoted by the West have also silenced alternatives to the state-system and alternative forms of 
sovereignty.19 For Strange, “non-Western sovereignty was actively delegitimated” during the period 
of colonialism, an observation shared by Dunn in the case of the Congo: “Traditional, indigenous 
sociopolitical structures and practices, as well as their autonomy and “sovereignty”, were viewed as 
illegitimate and erased”. 20 Members of the club of sovereign states impose their own requirements 
based on what they consider as non-negotiable values such as their “conceptions of community, 
religion, citizenship and property”.21 
 
 
Post-colonial and critical scholars have thus shown that sovereignty as understood in the West is 
intrinsically linked to the civilised values that Western societies portray themselves as embodying. 
Here, this phenomenon is termed ‘civilised sovereignty’ by which is meant the reliance of Western 
actors on self-constructed civilised identities in order to successfully claim sovereignty. This coupling 
of the two terms requires some precisions. Talking about ‘civilised sovereignty’ does not mean that 
claims to civilisation will necessarily give rise to claims to sovereignty. Some entities might perceive 
themselves as civilised yet not claim sovereignty for themselves or over others. In addition, and while 
civilisation is thinkable without sovereignty, sovereignty is also thinkable beyond Western civilisation 
– even though it remains attached to a desirable political state in order to take its full meaning.22 
Sovereignty can be developed outside of the West and outside of the Western normative order. If 
sovereignty is thus not restricted to the West, the universalised and supposedly culturally-neutral 
concept of sovereignty that dominates international relations has had a clear dependence on the ideal 
of Western civilisation. In this article, it is this specific ‘civilised sovereignty’ – and not sovereignty 
more generally – that is investigated. ‘Civilisation’ in this context can be understood to designate the 
cultural traits of a given population and its socio-political organisation, but also as a superior and 
desirable form of these traits and organisation.23 In this article – and in the context of the critique of 
the discourse of Western civilisation – the second understanding will be the one privileged.24 An 
important definitional aspect of ‘civilisation’ is that the term can only acquire its meaning through its 
opposition to savagery25 – a specificity that will reveal the problematic yet necessary reliance of 
sovereignty on a ‘savagery’ that must be present yet contained.  
 
 
Due to this intrinsic link to notions of civilisation, post-colonial scholars have argued that a more 
complete account of sovereignty necessitates to go beyond the West and to focus on the colonial 
experience through which Western civilised identity was forged.26 Indeed, "A genealogy of sovereignty 
that is confined to a Europe with its drawbridges up is necessarily an incomplete genealogy – one that 
 
 
is complicit with the attendant universalization of Europe.”27 In fact, the colonial encounter is now 
widely considered as crucial for the understanding of sovereignty.28 Aalberts for instance argues that 
“it is in the colonial encounter that the Europeans are produced as the original sovereign powers who 
command and impose their universal law vis-à-vis the uncivilised.” 29  The Western concept of 
sovereignty therefore emerges through the colonial experiences of the West (in a typical Eurocentric 
fashion, of course, the ‘civilised’ Western state is often separated from these interconnections and 
reinstalled as a discrete and self-sufficient entity).30  
 
 
If the Western claims to civilised sovereignty over their colonies have received sustained attention, 
how these claims were ‘brought back home’ and the way they interacted with the process of claiming 
sovereignty internally have not been analysed substantively. In particular, if claiming sovereignty 
domestically also implied the creation of an internal Other (and thus a domestic ‘colonial’ encounter), 
how these domestic and international encounters interact and how they can reinforce or undermine 
one another have not been explicitly addressed. In critical analyses, the interplay between internal 
and external constructions of civilised sovereignty is relegated to the margins and the overall focus 
remains on the external colonial encounter. Some crucial questions are thus left unanswered: how are 
the two processes (which historically happened at the same time) connected in practice, and for what 
purpose? Is this interconnection reinforcing or undermining the claims of the self-defined civilised? 
What can we learn from refusing to choose between a focus on the ‘civilised’ metropoles or on the 
‘savage’ colonies? These questions are all the more pressing given the widespread recognition that 
Western states failed short of their own standard of civilisation31 and that the internal and external 
colonial encounters shared some important similarities. 
 
 
This article thus reinforces post-colonial and critical analyses of sovereignty by interrogating together 
– and as two interlinked processes – the domestic and international constructions of civilised 
sovereignty. I do not advocate a supplanting but a re-balancing of analyses of sovereignty towards 
intra-European events but without excluding the extra-European colonial enterprises. Furthering the 
post-colonial research agenda, my analysis focuses on the connections between external and internal 
colonial encounters. As such, and by not restricting the idea of ‘frontier’ to the demarcation between 
the (Western) state and its ‘outside’, this article proposes to assess how these domestic and 
international processes interact in the creation of the sovereign and civilised identity of the West. 
 
 
 
From a Sovereign Kingdom to a State of Nature: Attacking the King’s Civilised 
Sovereignty 
 
 
 
 
For the purpose of informing this argument, this article focuses on a specific period of French history: 
the opposition of the League to Henry III and its progressive demise under Henry IV (1584-1598). This 
conflict started with the death of the younger brother of king Henry III in 1584. As the king had no 
children, the new heir to the crown became Henry of Navarre, a Protestant. But “the French Catholics 
served notice that they were not willing to accept a heretic on the throne”32 and they formed the 
League in order to impose their own truly legitimate (because Catholic) king. Hence, “[f]rom 1585 the 
union thus formed led to seizure of power and to civil war”.33 The prospect of a Protestant becoming 
king of France thus led to an acute and violent political crisis, 34 these religious disagreements being 
reinforced by political and social discontent. The conflict was marked by several – attempted or 
successful – murders against the kings and the leaders of the League (in particular the Guise family). 
In 1589, when Henry III is murdered, Henry of Navarre was not automatically recognised as king by 
most of the Catholics. Finally, in 1593, Henry of Navarre “decided the fate of France by formally 
adopting the Catholic faith, and in the following year, supported by the moderate Catholics, he was 
able to enter Paris in triumph”.35 Henry of Navarre is sacred king (and becomes Henry IV) in February 
1594. He is recognised the same year by the Sorbonne – a stronghold of Catholicism in the kingdom – 
as the “legitimate and real king most Christian, natural lord and heir to the kingdoms of France and 
Navarre”36 and absolved by the Pope in September 1595. The archives used in this section reflect this 
turbulent period in the formation of the French state and include political discourses, edicts, official 
declarations and pamphlets.37 The authors of these documents can be schematically divided into two 
groups: the two successive kings38 and their supporters on one side, and the League on the other (with 
the dominant figures of the Duke of Guise, the Duke of Mayenne and the Cardinal of Bourbon).  
 
 
The period under study is characterised by repeated attempts at destabilising the image of the king as 
a guarantor of civilisation and sovereignty (what I term a ‘crisis of sovereignty’, i.e. a ‘de-linking’ of the 
current holder of sovereignty with the civilisational values that support the concept). The most ardent 
proponents of this ‘de-linking’ are to be found, unsurprisingly, among the League advocates and those 
opposing Henry III. Charles of Bourbon talks in 1585 of “calamities” and “oppressions” in his famous 
Péronne declaration (B.N.F., Dupuy 87: f. 210 and 211v). Charles of Lorraine (a member of the Guise 
family) ‘describes’ in 1589 a “state strongly weakened by the continuous miseries and ruins that it has 
suffered” under the rule of Henry III (B.N.F., Dupuy 121: f. 100v). The deputies of Paris also express 
their concerns in 1588 in a remonstrance to the king: they enumerate the “oppressions”, “trouble, 
ruin and confusion” of the kingdom, its “disorders, miseries and desolations”, reminding the king of 
his responsibility before God for the good administration of the kingdom (all quotes are from B.N.F., 
Dupuy 844: f. 561 and 561v). 
 
 
Some go further and openly question the idea of unity necessary to a sovereign kingdom by 
mentioning the existence of a ‘civil war’. The Duke of Mayenne, for instance, frequently highlights the 
disorganisation of the kingdom and describes the conflict as a “civil war” (see for instance A.E., M.D. 
Espagne, 331: f. 61). This state of civil war is also associated to “sedition” among the subjects by 
 
 
Bourbon (A.E., M.D. France 761: f. 118), thus further highlighting the distance between the current 
state of France and the ‘natural’ obedience of the subjects found in a ‘civilised’ and sovereign state. 
In a discourse to the Duke of Guise discussing the topic of peace and war one League author estimates 
that “our police is so corrupted that it would be better calling our dispute a seditious tumult rather 
than a true war” (B.N.F., Cinq Cents de Colbert 30: f. 11v). 
 
 
This state of France performed by the enemies of the kings is particularly dangerous as it implies the 
failure of the king to ensure ‘civilisation’ and therefore his lack of sovereignty. These ‘descriptions’ of 
the kingdom help destabilise the king’s sovereignty but a particular strand of arguments also emerge 
that pushes this ‘de-linking’ further into a dangerous terrain. Indeed, analogies are made between the 
idea of the state of nature and the ‘descriptions’ of the internal state of France. Associating the 
kingdom with savagery represents a denial of the colonial frontier that the French kings rely upon in 
order to differentiate themselves from internal ‘savages’ (and as such to ensure the legitimacy of their 
sovereignty). That is why the League regularly uses the idea of savagery against the kings and their 
supporters. The concept of bestiality, for instance, is frequent during the period: after the 
assassinations of the leaders of the League by Henry III, Mayenne qualifies these murders as “cruelties 
and barbarity” perpetrated by the king (B.N.F., Dupuy 87: f. 279). A pamphlet published after these 
same events describe them as “cruelties inhumanly exercised” (B.N.F., Contre les fausses allegations: 
39). In another pamphlet of 1589 the author estimates that the factions and divisions experienced in 
the kingdom transform the inhabitants from “reasonable men” to “very wild and very cruel beasts” 
(B.N.F., Dupuy 203: f. 110). The remonstrances of the Estates General of 1588 also introduce several 
similar discourses establishing a link between France and the classic image of the state of nature. In 
1598 one such remonstrance explains how those who escaped the troubles “had to take refuge in the 
woods where they hoped to find more humanity among the brute, savage, and unreasonable beasts 
than among men that they found without mercy or compassion”.39 This attack is all the more effective 
as it plays with the association of the ‘woods’ with savagery and an absence of civility. These 
expressions contrast the king’s expected sovereign conduct – the attainment of a civil(ised) state – 
with his ‘actual’ achievements as performed by the League (a disordered and barely social way of life). 
France, for instance, has lost its attainment of justice: in a public discourse to the Estates one official 
declares that “we can actually call France the Mother of Laws, but a poor protector of them”.40 A 
remonstrance to the king goes further: “As for what concerns justice (the first firmament of the 
Kingdom, the anchor of the state, and the main link of love and obedience of the People for its prince), 
it is not half-perverted but completely gone and lost” in France.41  
 
 
Having lost justice and what makes a sovereign state sovereign the French kingdom becomes mere 
chaos.42 It has lost all the traits of a civilised and sovereign state, in particular its ‘valid’ institutions. 
The colonial frontier that the kings rely upon is dismantled when the leaguers compare France (and 
here Paris more specifically) to a new Babylon “without Law, without King, without Justice, where 
everyone is pulling in a different direction”.43 A similar 1985 pamphlet warns the king that his kingdom 
 
 
“is today almost without justice, without order and without police”. 44  The attacks against the 
sovereign king thus take the form of a fully-fledged depiction of ‘savagery’ in France, like in this 1589 
treatise of Louis de Gonzague (a fervent Catholic): 
 
[the consequences of the current troubles are] the entire desolation of this kingdom, so 
flourishing and formidable to all nations, be they Christian, barbaric or infidel; the depravation 
of the ecclesiastical discipline; the ruin of several beautiful and important buildings; the 
cessation of justice, trade, ploughing, communication that we used to have among ourselves 
(B.N.F., Dupuy 579: f. 104v-105). 
 
The different elements of this sentence are worth noticing: an absence of religion, of justice, of arts 
and of agriculture. All the institutions of a civilised – and thus sovereign – society seems therefore lost 
in France, a clear accusation against the king and his rule. In one of the most violent texts published 
against the king one pamphleteer accuses him of ‘sorcery’ and of being influenced by the devil. This is 
added to a charge against the ‘cannibal’ advisors that surround the king (all references are from B.N.F., 
Contre les fausses allegations: 20, 22, 34, 38, 43 and 48).45 The League is thus using the classical ideas 
of savagery and ‘state of nature’ to delegitimise the sovereignty of the king. In doing so they directly 
erase or rather invert the colonial frontier that the kings rely upon in order to justify their civilised 
sovereignty. 
 
 
 
Savagery in France and in America 
 
 
This bleak image of the French kingdom is particularly striking insofar as it moves France dangerously 
close to the peoples recently ‘discovered’ in America. Indeed, the discursive elements used by the 
League reveal the presence of a (supposedly external) savagery inside of France. In order to explore 
more fully this resemblance I introduce here some of the ideas used by the French to construct their 
‘external’ sovereignty over the ‘savages’ of Canada. These ideas were developed when the French first 
came into contact with the Amerindians in the 16th and first quarter of the 17th centuries and were 
thus contemporary to the ‘domestic’ struggles analysed in the previous section.46 While there is not a 
perfect analogy between these two cases because of the stark inequality of position suffered by the 
Amerindians, this section demonstrates that the discursive elements used to perform the state of 
nature of the Amerindians are similar to the discursive elements used by the kings’ adversaries at the 
end of the 16th century. The closeness of these ideas (demonstrated in this section) will later facilitate 
the invocation of this external colonial frontier in the context of the domestic struggle over 
sovereignty. 
 
 
 
 
The first striking element of similarity is that of misery and social disorder. The lack of sovereignty of 
the king(s) is regularly associated with a lack of social order that French explorers also found among 
the Amerindians. Biard for instance discusses the police (i.e. the government or administration) of the 
Amerindians in the following terms: “One cannot have a police in the absence of a community (…) Yet 
these savages having no big community, living one day at a time, not being linked to one another, 
because they are scattered and vagabonds, so they cannot have a great police”.47 The poverty and 
misery of the French people are also signs reminiscent of the Amerindians. The French generally 
consider the Amerindians to live a miserable life characterised by famine and hunger,48 a situation 
that is similar to the performed state of the kingdom. The use of references to the ‘woods’ is also one 
of the tropes of French discourses about the Amerindians that is commonly used by the League in its 
attacks against the king(s). 
 
 
The resemblance also extends to the state of war performed by the king’s adversaries: the repeated 
references to civil war inside of France offer a striking parallel between the (supposedly) civilised 
French and the performed savagery of the Amerindians. Indeed, the fact that the French are waging 
unjust wars among themselves seems to mirror the Amerindians’ ‘natural’ and ‘uncivilised’ warfare. 
Just like the French civil war the Amerindian wars are considered irrational since they are not 
motivated by legitimate reasons. As Sagard explains: 
 
There is almost no nation that is not fighting or in discord with the others, not because they 
want to possess their lands or conquer their country; but only to exterminate them when they 
can and take revenge for small wrongdoings or displeasures which are of negligible 
importance; but their bad [social] order and the fact that they do not punish the faulty citizens 
is the source of all this evil.49 
 
These small internal conflicts – which are also a sign of the Amerindians’ lack of civil society and 
institutional organisation (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1: 295) – are not considered as a just reason 
to go to war. Furthermore, these wars are not fought in legitimate (European) ways: for Biard, the 
Amerindians always attack by surprise and also use treason.50 Nevertheless, and in an ironic way, 
these characteristics – internal struggles, irrationality and treason – also apply to the internal French 
situation: the murder of the League leaders by Henry III is considered a treason and the existence of 
various ‘factions’ in France an unacceptable division of the French people. If the French perceive these 
Amerindian wars as ‘unnecessary violence’, their characterisation as ‘savage warfare’ seems to 
similarly apply to their own domestic struggles. 
 
 
More generally, the king’s adversaries perform an absence of justice in the kingdom, an interruption 
of religious practice, and a clear lack of what makes the French civilised (in particular agriculture and 
trade). All three elements are also central in performing the Amerindian state of nature. The absence 
of justice in France is mirrored by the absence of law in Canada: “These people in the main have no 
 
 
law, from what I could see”.51 Describing a group of Amerindians, Champlain adds: “I do not know 
what law they uphold, and I believe that for that matter they resemble their neighbours, who do not 
have a law at all” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1: 85). For others, their only law is to follow nature 
and the Amerindians live according to their natural instinct.52 When François I sends explorers to take 
possession of Canada in 1540 he also mentions this absence of justice and instructs his men to 
“establish laws and justice officers to make them live reasonably and in the love of God” (B.N.F., 
Français 5503, f. 190). 
 
 
This absence of law on both sides of the Atlantic is aggravated by the performed disrespect for religion 
(an accusation that is all the more important in the context of the War of Religion). Despite the 
portrayal of religion as central to the existence of a ‘civilised’ society53 it appears clearly that the 
French are similar to the Amerindians in their disregard for religious practices. The texts about the 
Amerindians regularly mention the absence of religion among them: Verrazano writes that “We did 
not see that they did sacrifices or prayers or that they possessed temples or places for cult”.54 Almost 
a century later, Champlain reiterates what has become a widespread opinion: the Amerindians “do 
not know how to adore nor pray God, living like brutal beasts” (B.N.F., Rothschild 1967: tome 1, 126). 
Hence it is established as a fact that this “brutish people” has “neither ceremony nor any form of 
praying God”.55 But instead of creating a stark contrast with the French these very accusations can be 
found in the French context in order to delegitimise the sovereignty of the king(s); religious 
persecutions, attacks against priests, interruption of the divine service and more broadly a lack of 
respect for religion are central elements that are used to characterise the French kingdom by the 
League. 
 
 
Ultimately, the troubles deprive France of all the attributes of civilisation, in particular of agriculture 
and commerce. Just as land becomes uncultivated in France due to civil unrest the Amerindians “do 
not plough the land”.56 Verrazano also indicates that “we saw no trace of cultivation” in Canada.57 
France and Canada seem to become united by the terra nullius idea predominantly invoked by 
Europeans to qualify the “uncultivated wilderness”58 of America. The once ‘flourishing’ kingdom of 
France – a clear sign of civilisation – now shares with Canada the attribute of ‘bareness’ that 
characterises the state of savagery. Combined with the impossibility of practising trade this absence 
of agriculture brings French and Amerindians together in their apparent lack of civilisation and thus of 
sovereignty. Hence, discourses designed to enact the uncivilised life and the absence of sovereignty 
of the Amerindians are also found ‘internally’ (thus threatening the existence of ‘civilisation’ and 
sovereignty in France). 
 
 
Re-Establishing Civilised Sovereignty: The Interaction between Internal and 
External Frontiers 
 
 
 
 
Are the French turning into ‘uncivilised’ and ‘savage’ Amerindians? In other words: how could the 
French kings still be sovereign in the ‘presence’ of a savagery reminiscent of the newly ‘discovered’ 
peoples of America? As this section will discuss, the re-establishment of an undisputable colonial 
frontier is the only way for the kings to ensure (the legitimacy of) their sovereignty. The kings need to 
attribute civilised and savage identities in order to differentiate themselves from ‘savage’ Others. As 
discussed previously, claims to sovereignty only become legitimate when they are attached to 
superior and desirable principles. In sixteenth-century France, sovereignty was strongly attached to 
the principles underpinning ‘French civilisation’ and in particular to a specific form of civilised justice 
and order. These principles were regularly defined by opposition to the ‘state of nature’ fiction, which 
reveals the importance of evolutionary thinking and theories of progress for sixteenth-century French 
sovereignty.59 Logically, then, the accusations of savagery are turned against the League in order to 
perform the civilised identity of the kings. In the process, one can see how the well-known colonial 
frontier between Europeans and Amerindians interacts with, reinforces and is reinforced by the 
domestic colonial frontier between the French kings and their adversaries. Colonial frontiers can thus 
be invoked in the process of claiming sovereignty in order to naturalise ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ 
identities. Here, the external colonial frontier is used by French actors in a domestic context in order 
to reinforce their own claim to civilisation and sovereignty. 
 
 
In the domestic sphere, then, the discursive (re-)construction of civilised sovereignty involves the 
identification of the League as an ‘internal’ Other. These attacks can be classified according to their 
intensity: some imply that the League is at the source of the current troubles; others that the League 
is a barbaric actor; and the last – and more extreme – attacks focus on how the League contributes to 
the creation of a state of nature inside of France. First, the League is characterised as the main reason 
for the existence of the troubles that de-stabilised the ‘civilised’ French kingdom. As soon as 1585 such 
attacks are frequent: Henry of Navarre estimates that the League “troubles today the tranquillity of 
this Kingdom”, has brought civil wars and a “great confusion to all things, poverty to the people, a 
decline of the Nobility, have ruined the clergy and made justice despised” (B.N.F., F-47171 (17): 5 and 
40). He reiterates this view in 1586 in a letter to the nobility, qualifying the League as acting against 
the tranquillity of the kingdom (B.N.F., N.A.F. 17874: f. 2). Near the end of the conflict Henry IV still 
mentions the “disorders, ruins, murders, pillages, sacrileges and other types of evils that they [the 
League] have brought to this Kingdom, thus turning it from the most beautiful and flourishing of 
Europe into the most misshapen, confused and miserable of the entire Earth”.60 
 
 
These attacks become stronger when they further associate the League to the ‘state of nature’ idea 
through the use of the notions of ‘barbarism’ and ‘inhumanity’. These concepts are used by Henry III 
to qualify the acts of the rebels (B.N.F., FZ-2052: 4) but also by Henry of Navarre to characterise the 
murder of Henry III as “the most barbarous act” (B.N.F. F-46889 (25)) and as a murder that even “the 
thieves and barbarians, and the enemies of humankind” would have not executed.61 An anti-League 
 
 
pamphlet of 1592 also ‘describes’ the League supporters as “deprived of all humanity” and as only 
following their “violent appetites”.62 The Parliament is similarly concerned by the fact that the League 
is leading to “the entire ruin and overthrow of all police and human society instituted by God, and 
even of this renowned and flourishing Monarchy”.63 The dissipation of ‘order’ and ‘hierarchy’ – such 
crucial ideas when identifying a ‘civilised’ society – are repeated in a 1589 pamphlet stating that “all 
the [social] positions are perverted, the temple of justice polluted, crimes not punished, innocence 
oppressed [and] laws without authority” (B.N.F., Français 6546 (3)). 
 
 
This successful association of the League with the creation of a state of nature in France is also 
achieved through an invocation of the ‘external’ colonial frontier. In a 1593 declaration written against 
the League and supporting the new king Henry IV after his conversion, the author estimates that the 
current troubles 
 
prevent working the land, remove all trade from the fair cities, award impunity to the vices, 
deprive an infinite number of places of priest, the priests of revenue, the poor people of divine 
service. In a nutshell, if we do not put an end to these unfortunate dissensions with a good 
agreement, it will not be long until we see France – the ancient house of the Catholic faith and 
of all humanity, the main support of the liberty and safety of the Christian countries, the name 
of a virtuous freedom – become a name for servitude, with her ancient humanity being turned 
into the most barbaric inhumanity of the Indies.64 
 
It is striking to notice that some of the categories used to perform the lack of civilisation of the 
Amerindians are being turned against the League supporters who still refuse to swear allegiance to 
the king. The League thus becomes the reason for the absence of the traditional signs of ‘civilisation’ 
that turns France into what was supposedly external, foreign and different to itself and its sovereign 
identity. This re-establishment of the domestic colonial frontier relies on an appeal to an ‘objective’ 
savagery (in the ‘Indies’), which shows how both spheres are intertwined in order to legitimise the 
sovereignty of the kings. In the process, of course, one notices how the identity of the colonies is 
further reaffirmed as savage. 
 
 
The appeal to America in the French domestic struggles can also be seen when Spain is mentioned in 
order to reinforce the civilised sovereignty of the French kings. Because Spain helped the League, it 
becomes an important enemy for the supporters of the king(s). But in their reference to Spain, these 
supporters insist on one particular element: the “unfair and tyrannical domination”65 of Spain over its 
possessions in America. This mention of the Amerindians serves to further entrench the frontier 
between savage and civilised actors that the kings necessitate (see B.N.F., F-46893 (9)). Evoking the 
promise of the Spanish king to financially help the League, a 1593 pamphlet accuses Spain of barbarism 
in ‘Peru’: 
 
 
 
where he [the Spanish king] drained all the mines and killed two millions of these poor peoples 
[the Amerindians] in the process due to all the detestable cruelties that Antiquity invented 
and that time has added (…) [talking to the Spanish:] Fearless butchers, your hands are 
impatient to find out if the French stomach (…) is softer than the savage one.66 
 
The external colonial frontier is here invoked to differentiate the ‘legitimate’ French rulers from the 
Spanish and Amerindians ‘savages’. Crucially here, both the Spanish and the ‘savages’ are performed 
as inferior Others and used to sustain, by contrast, the ‘civilised’ and sovereign identity of the French 
kings. This is reiterated in a 1590 pamphlet: “all the Christian nations, and even the Barbarians and 
Indians, give ample testimony of the harshness and tyranny that the Spanish use on those who are 
subjected to their sovereignty” (B.N.F., Dupuy 579: 158v). This reveals how the two colonial frontiers 
created by sovereignty feed into each other: the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ savageries performed 
by the French sovereigns mirror one another and provide the kings and their supporters with a 
confirmation of their civilised identity.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This article has shown how the discourses of sovereignty in sixteenth-century France are saturated 
with references to civilisation and savagery. Both sides appeal to the concepts of ‘barbarism’ and ‘state 
of nature’ in order to de-stabilise their opponent(s) while ensuring their sovereignty is preserved or 
recognised as legitimate. Among this confusion, the French kings are able to successfully perform 
savagery and attribute it to actors constructed as external to the sovereign state: the League rebels 
and the Amerindians. The existence of these marginalised subjects is essential for the sovereign centre 
to maintain its identity, superiority and unity,67 and references to the external colonial frontier play a 
key role in this process. This also means that sovereignty calls into being the problem (‘savagery’) to 
which it provides a solution. Indeed, sovereignty is built on the assumption of a unified and civilised 
political order; but the very performance of this political order requires the presence of an Other from 
which the sovereign voice can differentiate itself. And this Other – just like the Self – is only 
temporarily stabilised. The ‘savage Other’ is here both a necessity and a danger: it is necessary for 
international relations organised around sovereign states to continue to exist and dangerous since 
this constructed Otherness must be excluded and domesticated. 
 
 
Successfully performing sovereignty thus depends on the existence of colonial frontiers, i.e. the 
capacity to differentiate civilised (and sovereign) from savage (and unsovereign) actors, and these 
frontiers are intimately connected. Paradoxically, then, a refocus on the domestic dimension of 
civilised sovereignty reveals a fuller and more balanced picture of the Eurocentrism of the concept 
since the same discriminatory processes can be identified on both sides of what are, essentially, two 
civilised frontiers constructed on similar ideas of civilisation. These discourses of sovereignty are 
 
 
central in the discarding of political alternatives and as such participate in the establishment of (i) a 
domestic hierarchy between the legitimate ruler (or rulers) and those who have to obey and (ii) an 
international hierarchy between the legitimate (because ‘civilised’) form of rule and other forms of 
rule that are denied this legitimacy and importance. Sovereignty therefore seems to escape our 
simplistic binaries and our disciplinary boundaries: it plays a key role both domestically and 
internationally and it orders the world in both spheres by constructing civilised and savage identities. 
These hierarchically-ordered identities also reinforce one another: through their performed 
naturalness they serve to validate one another and thus to hide their own artificiality. The act of 
establishing these sovereign and unsovereign identities in one sphere is naturalised by the identities 
supposedly pre-existing in the other sphere. The crucial role of the ‘external’ colonial encounter is 
thus not to inform or provide content to the ‘domestic’ construction of sovereignty – after all, notions 
of civilisation and savagery predates modern colonialism – but rather to reinforce the ‘naturalness’ 
and ‘objectivity’ of these distinctions. 
 
 
This key strategy of production and differentiation from external and internal Others is central for 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is thus the ever-reproduced (and always in need of a further reproduction) 
performance of a civilised Self and a savage Other. If the specific historical period analysed in this 
article offers an analytically rich example of a ‘crisis of sovereignty’,68 this episode is not exceptional. 
Despite its intensity it is not an isolated incident and crises of sovereignty were frequent in the process 
of strengthening of the French sovereign state. Other major crises include the Guerre du Bien Public 
in 1464-1465 or the Fronde between 1648 and 1653. In this last event, for instance, another external 
frontier (between the civilised French and the barbaric Ottomans) was invoked in order to delegitimise 
or reinforce domestic claims to sovereignty. As such, these crises of sovereignty represent momentary 
and explicit examples of a deeper iterative need to perform and re-perform sovereignty on a daily 
basis. Even once the state is seemingly established sovereignty still needs to be produced and 
reproduced in order to be sustained. While these political struggles can achieve great political 
confusion when they succeed in inverting pre-existing colonial frontiers, the use of the external 
colonial encounter can play an important role in re-establishing the legitimacy of the Western 
sovereign. 
  
 
 
A note on the archives used: 
 
All of the archives used are translated from French by the author. The orthography and syntax have 
been modernised where necessary. For page numbers, a simple number is indicated; for folio numbers, 
an ‘f.’ comes before the number, and a ‘v’ indicates that it is the verso side of the folio. Archives that 
have not been published are cited as follows: 
- The place of conservation: A.E. [Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères], B.N.F. [Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France]; 
 
 
- Collection and manuscript number in the collection (e.g. “NAF 9384”), or reference number of the 
item (e.g. “F-23610”); 
- Page or folio numbers (in the manuscript or in the document when the document number is given). 
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